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Abstract
The purpose of this paper consists in assessing the extent of ﬁnancial integration
in the European Union using the Feldstein-Horioka criterion. More precisely, we test
the cross-correlation of savings and investment rates across the regions of the European
Union, using regional data from Regio and national statistical oﬃces, over the period
1995-2000. Several important outcomes are reported by our article. First, we ﬁnd that
the ﬁnancial integration seems to be realized inside each country, and we are able to
rationalize the few puzzles we face. Second, we ﬁnd that overall ﬁnancial integration
between EU regions is almost complete. After performing additional investigations on
consistent sub-groups of regions, however, our analysis discards the illusion that the sole
suppression of institutional barriers to capital mobility would be suﬃcient to achieve a
perfect ﬁnancial integration. In that spirit, our main ﬁnding is that History, language,
borders and distance as a proxy for transaction and information costs, still matter.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22, F21, G15
Keywords: Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, regional savings, investment, capital market, capi-
tal ﬂows.
Résumé
Cet article s'intéresse au degré d'intégration ﬁnancière au sein de l'Union Économique
et Monétaire (UEM) selon le critère déﬁni par Feldstein et Horioka (1980). Plus pré-
cisément, nous estimons la corrélation entre taux d'épargne et taux d'investissement en
utilisant des données régionales NUTS 2, issues de la base de données REGIO fournie
par Eurostat. Nous parvenons alors à plusieurs résultats importants. Tout d'abord, nos
estimations soutiennent que l'intégration ﬁnancière au sens de Feldstein-Horioka semble
réalisée à l'intérieur de chaque pays de l'UEM, et nous sommes en mesure d'expliquer les
quelques énigmes auxquelles nous faisons face. Un second résultat important renvoie à
l'intégration ﬁnancière entre toutes les régions européennes, qui semble en moyenne réal-
isée. Après avoir réalisé une série supplémentaire d'estimations sur des sous-groupes de
régions (construits selon des critères historiques, géographiques ou économiques), notre
analyse souligne cependant que la seule suppression des barrières institutionnelles à la
mobilité du capital est insuﬃsante pour atteindre une intégration ﬁnancière parfaite.
Dans cette perspective, nous mettons en avant que l'Histoire, la langue, les frontières et
la distance comme proxy des coûts de transaction conservent une certaine importance.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E22, F21, G15
Mots-clés : énigme de Feldstein-Horioka, épargne et investissement régionaux, marchés
de capitaux, ﬂux ﬁnanciers.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that international capital markets are now highly integrated. Al-
most non-existent at the beginning of the seventies, cross-border transactions in equity and
bonds, were more than 150% of United States GDP in the mid-nineties. In France, this ratio
turns from 3% in 1975 to 106 % in 1996, and exceeds 400% in Italy at the same era. In United
Kingdom, international transactions on bonds and equities amount to more than ten times
GDP at the end of the nineties (ﬁgures from van Wincoop, 2001).
In their seminal paper of 1980, however, Feldstein and Horioka initiated a well-known
quarrel by supporting the idea that international ﬁnancial markets were actually poorly in-
tegrated. They were driven to that conclusion by examining the cross-sectional correlation
between savings and investment across OECD countries during the 1960s and 1970s. The
intuition is straightforward: if capital is perfectly mobile, domestic saving and capital should
not be correlated, and capital should move freely where the rate of return is the highest. The
result pointed to a quite low degree of ﬁnancial integration, however: despite a large volume
of international capital movements, domestic savings and investment across OECD countries
were found to be highly correlated, with estimated coeﬃcients close to one. The resulting
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle paved the way to an impressive number of subsequent analyses of
the relationships between national savings and domestic investment, which focused either on
the econometric and statistical caveats, responsible for a bias towards a signiﬁcant, positive
and close to one coeﬃcient, or on the economic and historical circumstances akin to explain
the discrepancy between an expected coeﬃcient close to zero and its eﬀective value.
This paper belongs to the latter category of empirical approaches, by correlating regional
savings and investment to be compared with similar results but using international data. In-
deed, regional investigation has recently retained a growing attention, essentially because it
allows to study the Feldstein-Horioka relationship in a monetary integrated area, free from
a number of barriers and transaction costs. In that spirit, this paper wants to examine if
a study of the savings-investment relationship on a regional basis, combined with a histori-
cal/geographical perspective, can bring results which would support theinterpretation of the
Feldstein-Horioka criterion as a relevant indicator of the degree of ﬁnancial integration1. This
1The distinction has been ﬁrst introduced by Coakley et al. (1996), and recently reminded by Caporale et
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is done in a panel data context, relying on recent estimations methods accounting for problems
of ﬁxed eﬀects, endogeneity and serial correlation altogether.
Until now, research dealt mainly with countries able to provide the necessary regional
dataset, such as the big federations of North America or Japan. Regarding European Union
(EU) however, the United Kingdom was the only one to be the subject of an intranational
study by Bayoumi and Rose (1993). For all other EU countries, the lack of required regional
data made any intranational study impossible. Nevertheless, the recent development of har-
monized regional data, both by Eurostat and some national statistical oﬃces, allows now to
ﬁll this gap. Therefore, this article is the ﬁrst to provide an extensive regional analysis of the
Feldstein-Horioka criterion for EU countries wherever it is possible and over a time span for
which harmonized regional data are available - that is, the period 1995-2000. Consequently,
our ﬁrst point is to study the correlation between investment and savings at the national
level (i.e. between the regions forming a nation or a State). Furthermore, we will also try to
emphasize some speciﬁc links between some speciﬁc cross-border regional groups, which could
lead to a weaker correlation. Here, we want to explore the potential inﬂuence of historical
or geographical particularities, such as the presence of a common border or language. Last
but not least, we want of course to assess the impact of the economic integration in Western
Europe, on its way for several decades by now.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview of theoretical underpin-
ning and related literature. Afterwards, section 3 describes the methodology and the dataset.
In section 4, we present and discuss two sets of results. The ﬁrst group of estimations details
the correlations of saving and investment rates across the regions inside each country, while
the second one tests the Feldstein-Horioka criterion on consistent transnational or intrana-
tional groups of regions. Here, we assess the possible inﬂuence of geographical, historical or
economic links on regions ﬁnancial integration. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Pieces in the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle
In their pioneering study, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) examined the cross-sectional correla-
tion between savings and investment by testing this very simple equation:
al. (2005).
2
(
I
Y
)
it
= α+ β
(
S
Y
)
it
+ εit (1)
where
(
I
Y
)
represents the ratio of investment over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), that
is the investment rate. Similarly, the ratio of savings over GDP,
(
S
Y
)
, can be interpreted as
the savings rate of the economy. Indexes i and t respectively stand for the considered country
and year. Consequently, it is the value of the β parameter which focused until today the
interest of a substantial literature. Indeed, the apparent Feldstein-Horioka mystery has been
constantly fuelled by new studies, a lot of them emphasizing the signiﬁcance and robustness
of this β parameter, whatever the time span considered.
Explaining this so-called Feldstein Horioka puzzle is a matter of either econometrics or
of economic analysis. Let us start with a brief review of the former (statistical drawbacks
responsible for the bias of the correlation between savings and investment). Feldstein and
Horioka (1980), Bayoumi (1990), and Tesar (1991) consider that net instead of gross savings
and investment should be used. Others emphasize that savings and investment are procyclical,
and that a common economic cycle determines simultaneously the former and the latter.
Therefore, savings is endogenous and correlated with the residual. For addressing the resulting
bias, one has to ﬁnd an instrument. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) computed averages over
a long enough period of time, and they used demographic variables to handle sources of
endogeneity. One of them may occur if there is a policy reaction to incipient current account
imbalances to reduce it. The policy reaction argument has been made by Fieleke (1982),
Tobin (1983), Summers (1988), or Bayoumi (1990). It is also made in a recent paper (Coakley
et al., 1996) which emphasizes a cointegration relationship between savings and investment,
due to the fact that in the long run, policy must react to imbalance by equalling saving and
investment. The resulting constraint explains both why the correlation between savings and
investment is biased towards one, and why it is lower for developing countries. Not because
their degree of ﬁnancial integration is higher than for developed countries, but because they
are less capable of respecting the long run capital constraint equilibrium. In a time-series
context, Obstfeld (1986) argues that the world interest rate is not exogenous and determines
both domestic savings and investment. A shortfall in domestic savings will drive up the
world interest rate and thus crowed out investment in the country. This problem can be
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corrected by expressing saving and investment rates as deviations from their averages. But
even with this adjustment, Frankel (1986) ﬁnds that the correlation does persist. Much
more recently, Caporale et al. (2005) performed a Monte-Carlo study supporting the high
correlation case, while emphasizing a signiﬁcant heterogeneity across the 23 considered OECD
countries, however. Relying on a very similar set of countries (19 from OECD), Kim (2001)
uses cointegrated panel techniques to control the potential inﬂuence of various factors on the
savings/investment relationship, such as aggregate shocks (productivity, ﬁscal and terms of
trade), global shocks and country speciﬁcities, for example in size. On the whole, his analysis
conﬁrms the persistence of a high, positive correlation between savings and investment.
Another way of understanding the Feldstein-Horioka result is to put it in historical per-
spective. According to the latter, capital controls would have been the rule rather than the
exception up to a very recent period. Only the latest period from 1989 up to now can be
compared to the Gold Standard in terms of ﬁnancial liberalization and break-up of ﬁnan-
cial controls. In that process, international institutions have played a crucial role. One can
distinguish several of them: OECD which issues regularly Code of Liberalization of Capi-
tal Movements, WTO, which negotiates the liberalization of banking and ﬁnancial services,
attempts unsuccessfully to extend the liberalization of capital ﬂows to Foreign Direct In-
vestment. For developing countries, exposed to crisis of balance of payments and vulnerable
to speculative attacks, IMF has recently been the proponent of dismantling regulations and
capital controls, although in a less unambiguous manner than in the case of industrialized
countries. Regionalism is also the locus of ﬁnancial liberalization, as emphasized in Flandreau
and Rivière (1999): as soon as 1990, the Maastricht Treaty included explicitly the dismantling
of all capital controls across European countries. Alongside with the monetary integration
and the introduction of the euro, the very last obstacles to a complete ﬁnancial integration
have been progressively eliminated. As a result, the prediction of a coeﬃcient close to nil
should be validated either for the period prior to the First World War or to the period from
the beginning of the nineties up to now. Frankel (1992) argues that if the saving-investment
regressions were a good test for barriers to ﬁnancial-market integration, one would expect to
see the coeﬃcient falling over time. Until recently, this prediction has not been supported by
the evidence, whether from cross section studies, which typically report pre- and post-1973
results (...) or from pure time series studies (...) (p.198-199). The contrary is emphasized
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in Flandreau and Rivière (1999), who report that the coeﬃcient is generally lower after 1973,
with two exceptions (see table 1): Murphy (1984), and Penati and Dooley (1984). More
importantly, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly lower during the only period which is known to
correspond to a period of deeper ﬁnancial integration, that is the Gold Standard2.
Insert table 1 here
From Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) one can already notices that the degree of capital
mobility is higher across European countries. The coeﬃcient falls from respectively 0.73 to
0.46 when the equation is run before and after 1973 on a sample of nine EEC countries,
and from 0.91 to 0.67 when it is run on a sample of 23 OECD countries. The latter remark
points to the last possible explanation for the lack of international ﬁnancial integration over
more recent periods of time. Following Frankel (1992), the real interest diﬀerential is made of
three components. One can think ﬁrst of the covered interest diﬀerential, which captures all
barriers to integration of ﬁnancial markets across national boundaries, namely transactions
costs, information costs, capital controls, tax laws (discriminating by country of residence). A
similar argument is made in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) who argue that the Feldstein Horioka
puzzle can be solved by introducing costs of international trade in the form of iceberg costs.
The exchange risk premium and expected real depreciation are the two other components.
These two ones together constitute the currency premium, because they pertain to diﬀerences
in assets according to the currency in which they are denominated, rather than in terms of
the jurisdiction in which they are issued (Frankel, 1992, p. 200). The currency premium is
driven by a substantial exchange rate variability vis-à-vis the dollar since 1973 for European
countries, which can explain in the above-mentioned Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991), the
higher saving-investment coeﬃcient when estimated using a sample of OECD countries than
that found with a sample restricted to European countries.
A more radical way of eliminating the currency premium problem is to rely on intra-
national data, that is to correlate regional savings and regional investment across regions of
a single country, as originally suggested by McCloskey and Zecher (1976, 1984). This has
been done more recently in a few papers investigating the Feldstein-Horioka relationship on a
2Close arguments can be found in Lothian (2002), who focuses on real stock returns and real interest rates
convergence. Using a database covering several centuries, the paper concludes that periods such as interwar
appear as temporary disruptions in the historical process of ﬁnancial markets globalization.
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regional basis and the results are summarized in the table 2 next page which reproduces and
completes the survey table of van Wincoop (2001). Before presenting the main studies, it is
worth noting that two methods are mainly used in the literature. On the one hand, the panel
regression induces β from the estimation of : ( I
Y
)it = αi + β(
S
Y
)it + εit. On the other hand,
the cross-sectional regression estimates β from: ( I
Y
)i = α + β(
S
Y
)i + εi. Here, it is important
to understand that the index i stands for regions of the considered country or currency area.
Insert table 2 here
The very ﬁrst study is due to Sinn (1992), which ﬁnds a comovement coeﬃcient not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the United States. Even if these results seem natural
in the context of an old integrated monetary union, they are to be taken cautiously, since
they have been computed on only two years, more than a half-century ago. Using UK intra-
national data, Bayoumi and Rose (1993) ﬁnd that investment and saving rates are poorly
correlated for the eleven administrative regions of the UK, a diagnosis more or less conﬁrmed
by Thomas (1993). The study he provides involves also Canada, and the main result he ﬁnds
is almost the same that the one achieved by Bayoumi (1997), that is a coeﬃcient really close to
zero. For Japan, while Dekle (1996) ﬁnds signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients whatever the period
considered, Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) and van Wincoop (2001) exhibit systematically
signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcients between 0.3 and 0.4, no matter the period studied or the
econometric methodology used. Those coeﬃcients are higher than for the U.S. or the U.K., but
more importantly lower than the coeﬃcients obtained using international variables (cf. supra).
Besides, the two latter studies are basically the only ones to ﬁnd a positive relationship, all the
other ones supporting evidence of a negative comovement between savings and investment.
As emphasized by van Wincoop (2001), this negative comovement cannot be attributed only
to a measurement bias, but also to possible disagreements regarding the deﬁnition of regional
saving and investment rates.
Among this overview, the paper by Armstrong et al. (1996) oﬀers an original perspective.
Following explicitly the path of Bayoumi and Rose (1993), they tested the correlation sav-
ing/investment for the mid-1990s twelve EU members. Relying on national data, their study
considered EMU as an area on the way of integration, that is presumably in an intermediary
situation between the United Kingdom (an already integrated capital market) and OECD
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countries (with a high correlation between savings and investment rates). Their empirical
work supports the idea that the EU capital markets exhibited levels of integration on the
whole close to the UK intra-national one. However, the puzzle of negative coeﬃcients remain,
with a downward bias seemingly due to the inclusion of Portugal in the sample. Besides, the
authors emphasized, without explaining it, a possible business cycle bias, according to which
the correlation would be stronger (sometimes around 0.5-0.6) during period of recessions. Fi-
nally, their study do not perform any kind of intranational analysis inside European Union
countries, considered explicitly as homogenous regions of a wider area.
Consequently, beyond the updating of Armstrong et al. (1996)'s results using regional more
recent data, the present paper has two main purposes. First, it aims at generalizing Bayoumi
and Rose (1993)'s results for the United Kingdom to all other European countries, by testing
the Feldstein-Horioka criterion on a regional basis for each of them. Second, the use of a
regional basis will help to investigate the possibility of transnational/cross-border strengthened
ﬁnancial integration between some speciﬁc regions, which could arise from geographic or
historical reasons. In that spirit, we are going to work on the following variant of equation 1:
(
Ijt
Yjt
)
= αj + β
(
Sjt
Yjt
)
+ εjt (2)
where the letter j stands this time for regions, and not for countries, at a period of time
t. This will allow for a double study, intranational on the one hand (how integrated can be
all regions from the same country?), transnational on the other hand (how may be integrated
some regions from diﬀerent countries?).
3 Data and methodology: from regions to countries
Before getting into the details of our methodological choices, it seems useful to highlight that
the series required in such a regional investigation of the savings/investment relationship are
much more diﬃcult to get than their national counterparts. Indeed, the heterogeneity of
savings and investment deﬁnitions used in the few aforementioned studies comes mainly from
the lack of easily accessible regional data, which leads to choices for diﬀerent proxies and partial
deﬁnitions according to the considered country. For instance, Bayoumi and Rose (1993) do
not have complete data on regional investment. They use data for speciﬁc industries, which
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exclude between 25 and 50% of private sector investment. Besides, they rely alternatively
on an evaluation for households savings and on a more comprehensive other one, including
government consumption, however. By contrast, Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) could
access much more complete data for their study on the Japan. Therefore, regional saving is
the sum of saving by all residents and institutions of a region. Similarly, regional investment
is the sum of physical investment by ﬁrms, households and the local government in a region.
In the context of our research, an additional problem arises from the need for homogenous
macroeconomic accountancy deﬁnitions across countries.
Turning to our dataset, we could therefore retrieve homogeneous annual series for invest-
ment (gross ﬁxed capital formation, GFCF) and gross domestic product coming from Eurostat
harmonized regional accounts, available over the 1995-2000 period (Regio NUTS 2, European
System of Accounts, ESA 95. For Germany, only NUTS 1 data of GFCF were available).
Unfortunately, Regio does not provide any harmonized savings data at the regional level.
Additional investigations in publicly available national databases showed that this absence
could be explained for most countries by a lack of accessibility of such data, which are either
non-existent, or too partial to be exploitable, and/or conﬁdential. However, a complete re-
gional database of GFCF and savings is available for Germany, from the Statistic national
oﬃce of Baden-Württemberg (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg). For Italy, we
could rebuild series of savings, using the diﬀerence between regional GDP data provided by
Regio database and the total regional consumption, available from a regional database pro-
vided by the Italian research center CRENOS (Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud, Center
for North South Economic Research). For these two countries, a direct regional study of the
Feldstein-Horioka criterion according to equation 2 could therefore be proceeded.
For the other EU countries, we decided to proxy regional savings using disposable income3
data, the closer aggregate to savings we had. For this purpose, we postulate that disposable
income and savings rates grow identically, and consequently, the Feldstein-Horioka model can
be estimated using diﬀerentiated variables instead of levels. Formally, denoting disposable
income as INC, this leads to assume that ∆
(
Sjt
Yjt
)
= ∆
(
INCjt
Yjt
)
, and to estimate:
3This aggregate is accountably equal to the sum of households consumption and savings. It is therefore
diﬀerent from GDP Y , which is roughly equal to the sum of gross values added created in the economy
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∆(
Ijt
Yjt
)
= γ + β ×∆
(
INCjt
Yjt
)
+ υjt (3)
This method relies on two distinct hypothesis which can be immediately checked for Ger-
many and Italy. The ﬁrst one postulates that households savings are suﬃciently well correlated
to total (that is households plus ﬁrms plus government) savings, so that the variations of the
former mimic correctly the variations of the latter. The second one asks that the variations
of the households savings rate and the ones of the ratio of disposable income over GDP ( INC
Y
)
move proportionally.
In our case, the ﬁrst requirement is easily met for both Germany and Italy, since the
correlations of households savings with total savings reach respectively 90.7% and 88.3%.
Regarding the second requirement, it is easily conﬁrmed for Italy, with a 96.9% correlation
between households savings rate and the ratio INC
Y
; for Germany, the picture is somewhat
less clear, with a correlation reaching only 52%. But on the whole, our assumptions seem to
be validated. Besides, we will be able to check directly the empirical virtues of our proxying
method for Germany and Italy in the next section, where will be compared the estimations
deduced from the real savings data and the ones coming from disposable income. Eventually,
it is useful to highlight that our dataset stands halfway between the one of Bayoumi and
Rose (1993), constrained to rely on partial and heterogenous deﬁnitions for variables, and
Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000), who could access a complete and homogenous database.
Consequently, we can consider that our estimations will be reasonably reliable in terms of
national accountancy deﬁnitions.
Turning to estimations concerns, our overall panel consists of 108 European Union re-
gions, i.e. a 557 observations sample in levels (436 in ﬁrst diﬀerences) including Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Por-
tugal, Finland and Sweden -unfortunately, required NUTS 2 data were not available for Spain.
Regarding the special cases of Germany and Italy, the national databases amount respectively
to 96 and 114 observations. For all countries, the short time span prevents us de facto to use
the recent cointegration panel methods (Kim, 2001; Banerjee and Zanghieri, 2003). Besides,
this period includes the oﬃcial launch of scriptural (written) euro: it could therefore legiti-
mately be argued that such an event is likely to have created a structural modiﬁcation of the
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relationship between savings and investment. From a statistical point of view, however, the
very short time span does not allow the implementation of standard structural breakdown
tests (like the ones proposed by Chow, 1960, or Bai and Perron, 2003) for checking this in-
tuition4. At the economic level, one can highlight, nonetheless, that scriptural euro launch
did not fundamentally modify the process of ﬁnancial integration, on its own track since the
Single European Act of 1986 and the total liberalization in 1993.
Besides, the time dimension of our study asks to check for the possibility of serial cor-
relation in the residuals. To do so, we implement a Wooldridge (2002) test for temporal
autocorrelation in panel data. On the whole5, the test highlights the presence of highly se-
rially correlated residuals for Germany, but not for Italy, when estimating equation 2. For
equation 3, the presence of serial correlation is conﬁrmed for most countries. Furthermore,
the exogeneity of right-hand side variables, namely the savings rate or the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the ratio INC
GDP
must be tested, in order to check for an endogeneity bias. For that purpose, we
use Hausman (1978) and Nakamura Nakamura (1981) tests. The table 3 presents the results
of these tests for Germany and Italy, and for equations 2 et 3 respectively. Regarding the
savings rate, two alternative sets of instruments have been selected6: in a ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
the savings rate is instrumented using two of its own lags and in a second one, using the
contemporaneous value of the ratio INC
GDP
. Concerning regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences, the two
ﬁrst lags of INC
GDP
are used as instruments.
Insert table 3 here
Regarding equation 2, both tests fully agree to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity for
Germany, whereas evidence is more mixed for Italy. Turning to equation 3, the exogeneity of
INC/Y ﬁrst diﬀerence is widely accepted, even if a small uncertainty remains for Germany.
Concerning all other countries, for which are only available disposable income data, endogene-
ity tests, available upon request to the authors, conﬁrm that ∆
(
INCjt
Yjt
)
can be considered as
4The obstacle could be partly overcome using time dummies, however. Subsequent additional investigation
emphasized that dummies for 1998 and 1999 were not signiﬁcant most of the time, comforting our intuition
of no signiﬁcant breakdown.
5The full set of results is available upon request to the authors.
6The choice for instruments is often a complex matter, especially when estimations are performed over a
short time period, like in our case. The ones used in this article have been selected after a preliminary analysis
which have tested several possibilities the number of lags for the savings rate and the ratio INCGDP . All results
from this preliminary investigation are available upon request to the authors.
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exogenous.
The estimation strategy we set up accounts for the results of these tests for serial correlation
and endogeneity. For Germany and Italy, next section will present two sets of estimation for
equation 2, the ﬁrst one coming from a panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects, the second one
produced by a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with ﬁxed eﬀects7. However, the panel
regression for Germany will postulate ﬁrst-order autoregressive residuals, while the Italian one
will use conventional identically and independently distributed errors. Concerning equation 3,
the use of a panel regression is not relevant for a speciﬁcation based on ﬁrst diﬀerences. In the
context of the widespread serial correlation of residuals and the exogeneity of right-hand side
variable, all estimations based on equation 3 were processed using Ordinary Least Squares
with Newey-West standard errors for coeﬃcients - that is, corrected for heteroskedasticity and
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
More precisely, the subsequent analysis will divide in two parts, each of them relying on
a diﬀerent panel. The ﬁrst one follows explicitly the path opened by Bayoumi and Rose
(1993) on the United Kingdom, and wants to check if each country of our European sample
can be considered as a highly integrated capital market8 according to the Feldstein-Horioka
equation. The second one comes from the testing of Feldstein-Horioka criterion on consistent
transnational and/or intranational groups of regions. Here, we assess the possible inﬂuence
of historical, geographical or economic links on the ﬁnancial integration of regions. Account-
ing for the constraints arising from data availability, we are able to study seven consistent
transnational groups, represented on the maps located at the end of the section.
For clarity, transnational groups are indexed from 1 to 7 on the maps presented at the
end of the section. Scandinavian group involves Denmark, Finland and all the regions of
Sweden (Group 1 on the map). A second association is made of East of France (Alsace, Lor-
raine) and regions from West of Germany, that is Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz
(Group 2). Rhônes-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côtes d'Azur for France, and Piemonte, Lombar-
7Actually, all regressions, whether they were performed with instrumental variables or not, have been
performed twice, ﬁrst in a model with ﬁxed eﬀects, then in a model with random eﬀects. A Hausman test has
subsequently been run in order to discriminate which estimation is eﬃcient, giving then a clear preference for
ﬁxed eﬀects.
8Anintranational study cannot be provided for Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and Finland: the two ﬁrsts
are two small countries which are considered as single regions at the NUTS 2 level, while third and fourth do
not have more than two regions with observations.
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dia, Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria,
Marche, Lazio for Italy, jointly form a consistent area covering Southeast of France and North
of Italy (Group 3). Another pool includes Northern French regions (Nord-Pas de Calais,
Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Lorraine), the bordering Belgian regions (Luxembourg, Na-
mur, Hainaut, Vlaanderen, that is Flanders) and Luxembourg (Group 4). We examine also
the relevance of an area involving all regions from the Benelux association and neighboring
German regions, that is Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Niedersachsen (Group 5).
Encompassing Veneto, Salzburg, Tirol and Oberösterreich, group 6 tests the likelihood of an
Austrian-German-Italian mix. Finally, the capital group (7 on the map) comprises all the
capital regions or main economic centers of the studied countries: Paris, Berlin, Bonn (as the
former West Germany capital), Brussels, Wien, Roma, Milano, Copenhagen, Luxembourg,
Dublin, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Athens, Lisboa9. Regarding intranational speciﬁcities, we
will focus our attention on North/South Italy, Flanders/Wallonia (Belgium), and West Ger-
many/East Germany. Beyond the constraint of the number of observations, these cuttings
seem relevant both from historical and economic point of views.
Insert Figure 1 here
4 Results: a double look at the EMU
4.1 The intranational look
The results for Germany and Italy are based upon a complete dataset including investment
and savings, while for other European countries having the latter but not the former we will
have to use a proxy for savings. The availability of the complete dataset for two countries
allows testing the quality of the subsequent proxy, simply by comparing the estimates of the
Feldstein Horioka model (equation 2) and those of equation 3. Tables 4 and 5 report also the
results for the decomposition of Germany according to a West-East separation, and for Italy
according to a North-South axis.
Insert table 4 here
9No data at the NUTS 2 level was available for the region of Lisboa, so we substituted data from the wider
cutting NUTS 1.
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Insert table 5 here
Finally, table 6 presents the results of Sargan (1958) overidentiﬁcation test, necessary for
validating estimations deduced by the 2SLS relying on the set of instruments 1:
Insert table 6 here
From a statistical perspective, two main features arise. First of all, the Sargan test strongly
rejects lagged savings rates as a valid instrument for contemporary savings rate. This rejection
seems to be due to the inclusion of the poorest sub-regions, namely South Italy and East Ger-
many. If we restrict the sample to West Germany and North Italy indeed, the null assumption
is validated10. Unlike for the richest regions, saving rate in less advanced regions is likely to
be determined by other variables than its lagged values, like disposable income. Whatever
the exact reasons, the results are not robust and therefore they are excluded from subsequent
analysis. Thereafter, we will focus instead on 2SLS(2), based upon disposable income.
The second result concerns the validity of proxying savings by disposable income that is
of estimating equation 3 instead of equation 2. Comparing the estimates obtained for Italy
and Germany, for which both datasets are available, conﬁrms the intuition we had by simply
correlating savings and disposable income. The signs are the same and the absolute values of
the coeﬃcients are of the same order of magnitude. For Italy, -0.12 obtained for equation 2 is
not far from -0.07 which corresponds to equation 3. The estimate obtained with lagged savings
(2SLS(1)) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, -0.42, but the Sargan test indicates that this estimate is not
statistically valid. Besides, equations 2 and 3 deliver very close and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero estimates for East Germany and the whole country. Estimations for West Germany
are the only ones to diverge a bit since the 2SLS(2) estimate for equation 2 is signiﬁcantly
negative on the one hand, while all other estimates support a non-signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero β. Apart from this single exception, results in tables 4 and 5 conﬁrm that disposable
income can be used for proxying regional saving.
Turning back to economic concerns, our results for Germany and Italy corroborate the
conclusions in Bayoumi and Rose (1993) regarding the United Kingdom. The estimates are
never signiﬁcantly positive and Germany as a whole exhibits a β coeﬃcient not signiﬁcantly
10It is worth noting that the conclusions of the test remains identical when increasing the number of lags,
either for savings rate or disposable income.
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diﬀerent from zero, while estimates for Italy lie between 0 and -0.1. This suggests that both
countries exhibit an high degree of ﬁnancial integration according to the Feldstein-Horioka
deﬁnition. If this result is totally conﬁrmed for North and South Italy, and East Germany,
there is a slight divergence for West Germany, 2SLS(2) estimates supporting a signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcient a bit below -0.2. However, all other estimates, from panel least squares
with AR(1) disturbance, 2SLS(1) (statistically valid for West Germany) and from equation 3
agree to ﬁnd a nil β, which is more conform to economic intuition, since West Germany is an
old integrated monetary area.
Until now, German and Italian examples conﬁrm the idea of Frankel (1992) that the ex-
change premium would explain the biggest part of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Furthermore,
another important lesson from the analysis is that equation 3 can be estimated instead of equa-
tion 2. The subsequent step is therefore to estimate it for all European countries, including
those for whom real saving data are missing. This is done in the table 711 below:
Insert table 7 here
Some striking features emerge from a ﬁrst reading of the table. First, the coeﬃcient for
the whole Europe is positive and non-signiﬁcant. It stands just below 0.1, which according
to the criteria proposed by Feldstein and Horioka validates the hypothesis of a high degree of
capital market integration. This result is diﬀerent from that reported in Armstrong and al.
(1996), where β tended to be most of the time negative, with signiﬁcance depending upon the
period of time under consideration.
Two patterns of countries emerge. The ﬁrst one includes the geographic, historical, and
economic core of Europe. For this group of countries - Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands - the Feldstein Horioka coeﬃcients are close to zero and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from nil. Those countries are rich, the three largest are members of the G7, they are all
provided with a large international ﬁnancial market. The second group of countries is consti-
tuted of smaller countries belonging to the European periphery, namely Portugal, Greece and
Sweden. For them the correlation between savings and investment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, either positive or negative. As mentioned previously, negative β coeﬃcients are
11For the sake of consistency, estimates for Germany and Italy presented in this table and in table 8 are
estimated using Eurostat data, in order to avoid confusion of data from diﬀerent sources.
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widespread in the Feldstein-Horioka literature studying intranational data. If they are hard
to explain in most cases, the case of Portugal is pretty clear. Since 1975, the country beneﬁts
from a high level of FDI, and from 1986 from a high level of Structural Funds. Over 1995-2000
the inﬂows of FDI increased by 38.7%12 but real GDP by only 21.7%, while the saving rate
proxied by the ratio of disposable income over GDP decreased. As a consequence the β coef-
ﬁcient turns out to be negative in emerging countries like Portugal where investment exceeds
for structural reasons the country saving capacity. This ﬁnding echoes a recent conclusion
of Bayoumi and Park (2004), namely that one key determinant of ﬁnancial integration is the
level of economic development. The implication is that the ending process of Portuguese con-
vergence should be accompanied by a decrease of the absolute value of the beta coeﬃcient
towards zero13. Although Greece is like Portugal a catching-up country, it has not been able
to attract the same amount of FDI. Between 1995 and 2000 instead, FDI decreased by 2%,
while real GDP increased by 18.4%. As a result and not surprisingly the correlation between
disposable income and investment turns out to be (not very) signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
but unlike Portugal it is positive: no foreign inﬂows has come to push the investment rate up,
while the variation of the ratio INC
Y
is close to zero on overage over the period. Lastly, the
Swedish case is a priori more puzzling. Indeed, the Swedish GDP per head is amongst the
highest in the world; hence the rational behind a β equal to 0.53 cannot be that the ﬁnancing
of the economic development requires a high investment rate compared with a low saving rate.
The explanation is rather that the distribution of the population is concentrated in the south,
with a density of 253 inhabitants per km2 in the urban triangle (Malmö, Göteborg, Stock-
holm) but only 3 in the region of Norrbotten. As a consequence, most of the economic activity
is likely to be concentrated in the three corresponding regions from NUTS 2 classiﬁcation -
that is Stockholm, Sydsverige, Västsverige. Conversely, the savings and investment rate of
the northern regions should be characterized by a huge inertia, due to the lack of investment
opportunities and the underdevelopment of ﬁnancial intermediation. This intuition is tested
by running two additional estimations of the Feldstein-Horioka equation on two separate sub-
samples. The ﬁrst one consists of the three regions forming the urban triangle, and leads to a
12See the World Bank (2004), by the World Bank.
13According to OECD, FDI decreased by 27.1% in 2002, and by 56% in 2003, because of the strong compe-
tition between EU members to attract FDI. In 2003, public investments have also been cut by 26%, reaching
their lowest level since 1999.
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β coeﬃcient equal to 0.29, but really far from being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero - not even
at the 25% level. Consequently, capital seems to move freely across the three main economic
centers of the country, which seems quite natural. The second one is made of all Sweden
excluding these speciﬁc three regions; unsurprisingly, the regression gives an estimate of 0.77
(signiﬁcant at the 5% level) for the coeﬃcient β, conﬁrming the aforementioned argument.
4.2 Regions crossing borders
Table 8 contains the estimates of equation 3 for the subsets of regions previously described.
Most of them are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, with three exceptions: G7 and the
two Flanders estimates are positive, and the order of magnitude is similar to that found in
Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) for Japan.
Insert table 8 here
The Swedish puzzle vanishes when one considers a larger group of Scandinavian countries.
The coeﬃcient characterizing the degree of ﬁnancial integration for this group is close to zero.
Furthermore, they are related by close commercial links, echoing another result by Bayoumi
and Park (2004) who highlight that ﬁnance follows trade (p.3 and p.19), i.e. that ﬁnancial
integration is superior in areas where the intra-regional trade is highly developed. It is also
worth noticing that G1 group is mainly made of regions (those of Sweden more Denmark)
which are excluded from the European process of monetary integration. In the same spirit, the
groups based upon historical links, like G3 and G6, are ﬁnancially integrated, with coeﬃcients
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Groups 2, 4 and 5 exhibit negative coeﬃcients, none of
them being statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the extent of theses negative coeﬃcients
remains puzzling. The composition of the group excludes of course to rely on the same kind
of explanation than the one used for Portugal. It seems therefore plausible that we face
an accountancy problem similar to the one analyzed by van Wincoop (2001), for whom the
negative β are related to a problem of regional public savings deﬁnitions. Anyhow, all these
six groups are characterized by a high degree of ﬁnancial integration, which emphasizes the
importance of sharing a common border and/or a common language in promoting capital
mobility, as emphasized in Bayoumi and Park (2004).
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The positive coeﬃcient for G7 (capitals) or the relatively low degree of ﬁnancial integration
between capitals, which by deﬁnition do not share a common border and do not speak the
same language14, strengthens a contrario the result about borders and languages. Our regions
crossing borders are also characterized by short internal distances. Portes and Rey (2005) use
distance as a proxy for information costs and for asymmetry of information between domestic
and foreign investors. They use a gravity approach and show that distance exerts a negative
inﬂuence on international capital ﬂows. Our regions crossing borders are characterized by
short distances within them, which suggest the same link between geography (distance) and
ﬁnance. Consequently, European ﬁnancial integration, while being strongly supported by the
process of EMU, remains somewhat imperfect by phenomena related to distance and to a
kind of home market bias and for close, or at least frontier, regions. This is illustrated by the
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the capitals and main economic centers.
Results for intranational sub-groups do not bring any big innovation relatively to our
previous ﬁndings: for Germany and Italy, estimates on Eurostat data are very close to the
ones deduced from national statistical oﬃces, and keeps emphasizing that these sub-national
groups are well integrated according to Feldstein-Horioka criterion. A noticeable exception
is Flanders however, which is featured by a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient around 0.4,
whether Brussels is included in the estimation or not. This relatively low capital mobility
can be explained by a combination of a language barrier (French and English remain the
main language spoken by Belgian businessmen, Flemish remaining fairly isolated), and the
lack of a large ﬁnancial center. The case empirically illustrates a recent argument of Martin
and Rey (2004), who stress the importance of the market size in explaining the volume of
ﬁnancial transactions. Indeed, the result for Flanders suggests that the narrowness of the
capital market jointly with the existence of a linguistic and cultural fracture blocking the
access to the great local market (Brussels), are likely to explain the low degree of ﬁnancial
integration.
14English language is of course often used, but still remain the problems of commercial habits and negotiation
cultures, which can constitute real barriers to trade. On that ground, Mélitz (2005) emphasizes that the
practice of English does not foster the trade of goods more than French or Spanish.
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5 Conclusion
To conclude, our major original contribution in this paper consists in applying the Feldstein-
Horioka criterion to European regional data for a large number of EU members. This dataset
allowed us to estimate the comovement coeﬃcient between savings and investment not only
inside each individual country but also, between transnational groups our inside intranational
sub-groups. Several important outcomes are reported by our article.
First of all, ﬁnancial integration seems to be realized inside most of the considered coun-
tries, which corroborates a contrario Frankel (1992)'s hypothesis of a currency premium im-
peding the realization of a perfect ﬁnancial world. Moreover, we propose an explanation for
some puzzles already highlighted in the literature, like the negative coeﬃcient in the Por-
tuguese case, already stressed in Armstrong et al. (1996), and new ones like the Swedish
positive coeﬃcient. As in Bayoumi and Park (2004), we especially argue that the process of
economic development does inﬂuence the extent of ﬁnancial integration.
Furthermore, we found a coeﬃcient of 0.09 across all the regions forming European Union.
This ﬁgure indicates that overall ﬁnancial integration seems to be completed with the euro
launch. In order to shed a new light on the latter result, we have tested the relationships
between saving and investment in consistent sub-groups of regions (designed according to
geographical, economic or historical criteria). Following a recent strand of research applying
the analytical frameworks of international trade to ﬁnancial transactions, our ﬁnding is that
History, language, borders and distance as a proxy for transaction and information costs,
matter. Especially, we show that ﬁnancial integration is not impeded by the existence of
borders, but by distance and by linguistic diversity, interpreted as proxies for transaction and
information costs. Consequently, if monetary integration is a necessary step in the process of
ﬁnancial integration, it is not suﬃcient, in as much as other barriers, including information
and transaction costs, are still important.
Finally, our analysis discards the illusion that the sole suppression of institutional barriers
to capital mobility would be suﬃcient to achieve a perfect ﬁnancial integration everywhere
and at any moment. As in Flandreau and Rivière (1999), Bayoumi (1990), Eichengreen
(1992), Zevin (1992), Taylor (1998), and others, we emphasize that history, geography, culture
and policy altogether matter. All these factors keep contributing today to ﬁnancial markets
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incompleteness, preventing therefore a perfect capital mobility.
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Figure 1: Transnational groups
Map 2:  second set of groups
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Table 1: Correlation between savings and investment: the historical perspective
Authors Gold Standard Interwar Bretton Woods Floating rates
Flandreau and Rivière (1999) 1880-1913 1918-1939 1945-1973 1974-1996
Pooling 0.46 (0.03) 0.77 (0.03) 0.86 (0.02) 0.34 (0.03)
Within 0.44 (0.03) 0.64 (0.03) 0.78 (0.02) 0.68 (0.11)
Between 0.48 (0.18) 0.97(0.082) 0.94 (0.09) 0.22 (0.04)
Number of countries 16 15 24 24
Murphy (1984) 1960-1974 1975-1980
Between 0.89 (0.08) 0.95(0.10)
Number of countries 17 17
Penati and Dooley (1984) 1949-1959 1974-1981
Between 0.69 (0.10) 0.88 (0.16)
Number of countries 19 19
Dooley et al. (1987) 1960-1973 1974-1984
Between 0.75 (0.10) 0.74 (0.17)
Number of countries 14 14
Feldstein and Bachetta (1991) 1960-1973 1974-1986
Between 0.91 (0.07) 0.67 (0.15)
Number of countries 23 (OECD) 23 (OECD)
1960-1973 1974-1986
Between 0.73 (0.15) 0.46 (0.38)
Number of countries 9 (EEC) 9 (EEC)
Bayoumi (1990) 1880-1913 1966-1970 1981-1985
Between 0.29 (0.46) 0.96 (0.10) 0.72(0.12)
Number of countries 8 10 10
Tesar (1991) 1960-1974 1975-1986
Between 0.89 (0.10) 0.81 (0.18)
Coakley et al. (1994) 1960-1974 1975-1992
Between 0.88(0.06) 0.65 (0.10)
Number of countries 23 23
Bayoumi (1997) 1885-1913 1960-1971 1975-1993
Between 0.53 (0.29) 0.84 (0.07) 0.65 (0.10)
Number of countries 9 22 22
Kim (2001) 1960-1992
Cointegrated panel 0.69 (0.25)
Number of countries 19 (OECD)
Caporale et al. (2005) 1948-1998
Various estimators/MC simulations close to 1
for 3/5 countries
Number of countries 23 (OECD)
Notes: adapted from Flandreau and Rivière (1999). Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Correlation between savings and investment: the intranational look
Authors Country Statistical Method Sample Estimate
of comovement
Sinn(1992) United States Cross-Sectional 1957 -0.12 (0.08)
regression 1953 -0.06 (0.08)
Bayoumi United Kingdom Panel regression 1971-1975 -0.48(0.16)
and Rose (1993) 1976-1980 0.24 (0.21)
1981-1985 0.01 (0.14)
United Kingdom Cross-sectional 1971-1975 -0.99 (0.53)
regression 1976-1980 0.54 (0.80)
1981-1985 0.03 (0.33)
Thomas (1993) United Kingdom Panel regression 1971-1987 -0.56 (0.13)
Canada Panel regression 1961-1989 -0.10 (0.02)
Armstrong European Union Cross-sectional regression 1971-1975 0.17 (0.09)
et al. (1996) 1976-1980 -0.55 (0.59)
1981-1985 -0.36 (0.29)
1986-1991 -0.23 (0.13)
Cross-sectional 1971-1975 -0.03 (0.14)
regression 1976-1980 -0.35 (0.13)
1981-1985 -0.31 (0.21)
1986-1991 -0.24 (0.21)
Dekle (1996) Japan Cross-sectional 1975-1988 -0.36 (0.08)
regression 1975-1979 -0.44 (0.11)
1980-1984 -0.32 (0.09)
1985-1988 -0.24 (0.05)
Bayoumi (1997) Canada Cross-sectional 1961-1993 -0.07 (0.08)
regression
Iwamoto and Japan Cross-sectional 1975-1980 0.30 (0.15)
van Wincoop (2000) correlation 1980-1985 0.47 (0.10)
1985-1990 0.43 (0.10)
Time-series 1975-1990 0.31 (0.04)
correlation
van Wincoop (2001) Japan Panel regression 1970-1990 0.31 (0.03)
Cross-sectional 1975-1980 0.21 (0.13)
regression 1980-1985 0.32 (0.11)
1985-1990 0.21 (0.08)
Cross-sectional 1975-1980 0.26 (0.15)
correlation 1980-1985 0.43 (0.10)
1985-1990 0.40 (0.11)
Average time-series 1975-1990 0.31 (0.04)
correlation
Notes: adapted from van Wincoop (2001). Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Endogeneity tests of right-hand side variables
Germany Italy
Equation 2
Test Instruments 1 Instrument 2 Instruments 1 Instrument 2
Hausman : Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.61
Nakamura-Nakamura : t = -8.17 -4.33 0.81 -1.82
Equation 3
Hausman : Prob > chi2 = 0.02 N.R. 0.30 N.R.
Nakamura-Nakamura : t = 0.23 N.R. .,48 N.R.
Notes: N.R.: Non Relevant. For equation 2, Instruments 1 = two lags of S/Y , Instrument 2: INC/Y . For
equation 3, Instruments 1 = two lags of ∆
(
INC
Y
)
Table 4: Germany
Equation 2 Equation 3
N LS(AR1 ) 2SLS (1) 2SLS (2) N OLS Newey-West
All Germany
1995-2000 96 0.08 (0.23) -0.64 (0.70) 0.79 (0.62) 96 0.02 (0.28)
West
1995-2000 66 -0.10 (0.28) -0.37 (0.26) -0.23a(0.08) 66 0.31 (0.23)
East
1995-2000 30 0.26 (0.46) -0.63 (3.09) 0.21 (0.29) 30 0.14 (0.38)
Notes: (1) and (2) refer respectively to instruments sets 1 and 2 described in the previ-
ous section. a, band cdenote signiﬁcance, respectively at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Standard errors in parentheses.
26
Table 5: Italy
Equation 2 Equation 3
N LS 2SLS (1) 2SLS (2) N OLS Newey-West
All Italy
1995-2000 114 -0.12c(0.07) -0.42b(0.17) 1.43 (3.03) 95 -0.07c(0.04)
North
1995-2000 66 -0.08 (0.06) -0.21 (0.14) 1.03 (1.02) 55 -0.06 (0.06)
South
1995-2000 48 -0.27 (0.18) -0.73 (0.47) 0.61 (1.15) 40 -0.09c(0.05)
Notes: (1) and (2) refer respectively to instruments sets 1 and 2 described in the previous
section. a, band cdenoting respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Overidentiﬁcation test
χ2(1) Signiﬁcance
level
Germany 43.02 0.00
West Germany 1.34 0.25
East Germany 20.71 0.00
Italy 3.42 0.08
North Italy 0.39 0.53
South Italy 3.94 0.05
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Table 7: Intranational comovement savings/investment
Country number of estimation of
observations β coeﬃcient
NUTS2 436 0.09 (0.08)
Belgium 55 0.17 (0.16)
Germany 80 0.24 (0.27)
Greece 65 0.14c(0.10)
France 63 0.09 (0.09)
Italy 95 0.02 (0.11)
Netherlands 48 -0.29 (0.28)
Austria 27 0.34 (0.27)
Portugal 16 -1.24a(0.34)
Sweden 40 0.53b(0.26)
Notes: a, band cdenoting respectively signiﬁcance
at the 1, 5 and 15% levels. Standard er-
rors in parentheses.
Table 8: Comovement between savings and investment in transnational/intranational groups
Regional Group number of estimate
observations of coeﬃcient β
G1: Scandinavia 55 0.32 (0.59)
G2: East France/West Ger. 16 -0.53 (0.47)
G3: North Italy/South France 59 0.04 (0.15)
G4: North France/Belg./Lux. 32 -0.23 (0.27)
G5: Germany/Benelux 44 -0.52 (0.37)
G6: Austria/Germany/Italy 27 -0.04 (0.21)
G7: Capitals 58 0.25b(0.13)
North Italy 55 0.07 (0.16)
South Italy 40 - 0.11 (0.16)
Flanders(Bruss. incl.) 30 0.39b(0.17)
Flanders (Bruss. excl.) 25 0.41b(0.18)
Wallonia (Bruss. incl.) 30 -0.25 (0.29)
Wallonia (Bruss. excl.) 25 -0.28 (0.34)
West Germany 55 0.15 (0.26)
East Germany 25 0.45 (0.46)
Notes: a,b, and crespectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
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